SPEECH 


77? 


R.  M.  SAUNDERS,  OF  NORTH  CAROLINA, 


ECEIVING,    REFERRING,    OR   REPORTING    OIV 
ABOLITION   PETITIONS. 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OP  REPRESENTATIVES,  JANUARY  19  &  23,  1844. 


WASHINGTON  : 

PRINTED    BY   BLAIR   AND    RIVES. 

1844. 


SPEECH. 


On  the  motion  of  Mr.  Biack,  of  Georgia,  to  amend  the  motion  of  Mr. 
Dromgoole,  of  Virginia,  to  recommit  the  Report  of  the  Select  Com- 
mittee on  the  Rules,  by  instructing  them  to  report  to  the  House  the 
following  Rule,  viz  : 

"  No  petition,  memorial,  resolution,  or  other  paper  praying  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District 
of  Columbia,  or  any  State  or  Territory,  or  the  slave-trade  between  the  States  or  Territories  of  the 
United  States  in  which  it  now  exists,  shall  be  received  by  this  House,  or  entertained  in  any  war 
whatever ;" 

Mr.  SAUNDERS  rose  and  spoke  to  the  following  effect — 

It  is  my  purpose,  Mr.  Speaker,  to  vindicate  the  21st  rule,  and  to  answer 
such  of  the  recent  prominent  objections  as  have  been  urged  against  it. 
Whilst  I  have  manifested  some  anxiety  to  obtain  the  floor  at  an  earlier  day, 
I  had  not  desired,  at  the  outset,  any  discussion  on  the  subject  whatever. 
Hence  my  votes  to  lay  on  the  table,  and  for  the  previous  question.  Not 
that  I  felt  unwilling  to  meet  the  opponents  of  the  rule  in  debate,  but  that  I 
supposed  discussion  on  the  subject  would  do  no  good  here,  and  might  pro- 
duce mischief  elsewhere.  In  saying  this,  I  beg  to  be  understood  as  not 
complaining  of  my  colleague,  [Mr.  Ciingman",]  who  addressed  the  House 
some  days  since ;  because  from  his  situation,  his  unfortunate  situation,  as 
I  consider  it,  (separated  from  the  delegation  of  his  own  State,  and  the 
entire  delegation  of  the  South,)  explanation  on  his  part  was  both  proper 
and  becoming.  But  he  will  pardon  me  for  saying,  however  well  satisfied 
he  may  be  with  his  own  course,  and  however  much  he  may  feel  flattered  by 
the  manner  in  which  his  remarks  may  have  been  received  in  certain  parts 
of  the  House  and  of  the  country,  I  doubt  if  they  will  prove  equally  satis- 
factory to  the  section  of  country  from  whence  wre  come. 

But,  sir,  I  am  admonished,  by  the  limits  of  my  hour,  to  proceed  at  once 
to  the  points  which  have  been  made  in  the  debate.     It  is  said,  in  the  first 

^. 


^ 


4 

place,  as  I  understand  the  objections,  that  the  rule  violates  the  right  of  peti- 
tion ;  that  it  is  wrong  in  itself,  having  been  productive  of  no  good,  but  much 
mischief:  and  that  it  should  be  revoked,  in  obedience  to  the  public  senti- 
ment at  the  North,  in  order  to  save  those  friends  and  allies  who  have  stood, 
so  manfully  by  us  in  support  of  the  rule.  These,  I  believe,  cover  the  whole 
ground  of  objection,  and  these  I  hope  to  meet  and  answer  in  a  satisfactory 

way. 

First :  It  is  said  the  rule  violates  the  sacred  and  constitutional  right  of 
petition.  It  has  been  distinctly  asked,  and  I  repeat  the  question,  What  is 
it  gentlemen  mean  by  the  right  of  petition  ?  We  desire  some  precise  and 
definite  answer — not  the  vague  and  general  answer  which  has  been  given, 
that  it  means  the  same  thing  in  regard  to  abolition  petitions  that  it  does  in 
regard  to  all  other  petitions.  This,  with  due  submission,  is  no  answer  at  all. 
We  desire  to  know  wiiere  the  right  begins  and  where  it  ends.  If  it  be,  as  is 
contended,  a  constitutional  right,  which  the  House  is  bound  to  respect,  then 
most  certainly  it  is  susceptible  of  some  precise  definition.  If  gentlemen 
mean  merely  to  say  that  the  people  have  the  right  peaceably  to  assemble, 
and  to  petition  Congress  for  a  redress  of  grievances,  then  it  was  not  neces- 
sary to  travel  back  to  Magna  Oharta  to  establish  what  none  will  question. 
And  I  go  further,  and  admit  not  merely  the  right  of  the  people  thus  to 
assemble  and  petition  for  a  redress  of  grievances,  whether  real  or  imagina- 
ry, but  they  have  a  right  to  expect  from  their  Representatives  an  answer 
to  their  petitions.  But  if  am  to  understand  these  advocates  of  the  right  of 
petition,  as  denying  to  Congress  the  right  of  deciding  as  to  the  manner  and 
mode  of  giving  this  answer,  as  well  as  the  time  when,  then  I  am  prepared 
to  contest  the  existence  of  any  such  right.  The  Constitution  declares  : 
"  Congress  shall  make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the 
press,  or  of  the  right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble  and  to  petition 
the  Government  for  a  redress  of  grievances." 

Now,  sir,  I  doubt  not  the  cause  suggested  by  my  friend  from  South 
Carolina,  [Mr.  Rhett,]  the  Riot  and  Sedition  Acts,  as  they  existed  in 
the  mother  country,  was  the  true  cause  of  inserting  this  prohibitory  article 
jn  the  Amendments  to  the  Constitution.  But  whatever  may  have  been  its 
origin,  we  find  it  in  the  Constitution,  and  as  intended  to  guard  the  personal 
privileges  of  the  citizen  ;  and  as  such  it  commands  our  respect.  You  shall 
make  no  law  (and  the  rules  of  this  House,  as  I  admit,  are  laws,  so  far  as 
this  matter  is  concerned)  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech.  Yet,  at  the  last 
Congress,  you  adopted  the  one  hour  rule,  and  have  again  adopted  it,  thus 
limiting  every  member  in  his  right  of  speech  to  one  hour.  Again,  you 
have  a  rule  authorizing  a  call  for  the  previous  question,  which,  when  sus- 


Gained  by  a  majority,  closes  all  debate,  and  even  cuts  off  debate  at  tbe  out- 
set, if  then  put  and  carried. 

These  rules  most  clearly  abridge  the  freedom  of  speech  ;  yet  they  rest  on 
the  power  of  the  House — a  power  which  belongs  to  all  Parliamentary  bodies, 
of  regulating  its  own  proceedings.  Your  one  hour  rule  presupposes  the 
indulgence  of  unlimited  debate  as  retarding  the  business  of  the  House  ;  and 
your  previous  question  is  founded  on  the  belief  that  any  debate  is  injurious 
to  the  public  interest.  Hence,  whilst  many  have,  and  still  question  the 
propriety  of  these  rules,  none  can  deny  your  power  to  enact  them,  as  a 
means  of  regulating  abuses. 

Again  :  Congress  shall  make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  the  press  ; 
and  though  I  be  no  advocate  for  sedition  laws,  and  would  sooner  see  it  run 
into  licentiousness  than  have  it  curtailed  in  its  privileges,  yet  I  suppose  none 
can  doubt  the  power  of  Congress  to  make  it  an  indictable  offence  for  any 
press  here  to  libel  a  member  by  a  false  charge  of  bribery.  But  to  the  matter 
an  debate. 

It  is  asserted  that  the  rule  violates  the  right  of  petition.  How  ?  Because 
it  excludes  the  petition  from  being  received,  heard,  and  acted  on.  By  the 
Parliamentary  law,  no  petition  is  receivable  unless  on  leave  ;  and  as  modi- 
fied by  the  rules  of  the  House,  any  member  may  object,  and  raise  the  question 
of  reception — determinable  by  a  majority.  This  is  the  principle  on  which  the 
rule  for  excluding  abolition  petitions  rests.  A  majority  desire  to  save  the 
time  of  the  House,  by  avoiding  this  question  of  reception  on  every  petition 
which  is  debatable,  and  because  they  believe  Congress  possesses  no  power 
to  legislate  on  such  matters ;  or  if  they  have  the  power  to  legislate,  they 
ought  not  to  do  so ;  and  hence  the  rule  for  excluding  such  subjects  alto- 
gether. It  is  the  solemn  judgment  of  a  majority,  adopted  after  argument 
and  deliberation.  It  is  the  very  question  we  are  now  considering,  whether 
this  rule  shall  stand  as  the  judgment  of  the  House. 

But  it  is  said,  you  do  not  give  the  petition  a  hearing  ;  and,  says  my  col- 
league, [Mr,  Ciingman,]  you  cannot  know  that  the  petition  asks  for  that 
which  is  unconstitutional,  witlwut  a  hearing.  And  herein,  Mr.  Speaker, 
consists  the  fallacy  of  the  argument,  because  it  is  not  true  in  point  of  fact. 
Your  rule  declares  "that  no  petition  or  other  paper,  praying  the  abolition 
of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  or  any  State  or  Territory,  or  the 
slave-trade  between  the  States,  shall  be  received  by  the  House."  Now, 
sir,  unless  the  prayer  of  the  petition  asks  for  one  of  these  four  things, 
the  rule  has  no  effect.  The  rule  does  not  attack,  nor  is  the  Speaker  autho- 
rized to  put  it  in  force  until  he  learns  from  the  member,  or  by  reading  it 
himself,  that  its  prayer  embraces  one  of  these  objects.  The  member  is 
heard,  and,  through  him,  the  petitioner  speaks,  in  a  "brief  statement"  of  the 


6 

contents  of  the  petition  ;  not  by  giving  the  argument,  but  tbe  facts,  and 
what  it  is  the  petition  asks  to  be  done.  It  is  on  this  statement  that  the 
Speaker  pronounces  the  decision  of  the  House,  as  declared  by  the  majority 
in  the  adoption  of  the  rules,  that  they  will  not  legislate  on  the  subject  of 
abolishing  slavery  in  the  States,  the  District,  the  Territories,  or  the  slave 
trade  between  the  States ;  and  therefore  it  is  they  will  not  receive  any  peti- 
tion touching  these  matters. 

I  admit,  whenever  a  majority  are  prepared  for  legislation  on  any  one  of 
these  subjects,  the  rule  should  be  so  modified  or  rescinded.  But  unless  the 
majority  are  thus  prepared  for  action,  the  rule  should  stand  ;  as  I  think  I 
have  succeeded  in  showing  it  neither  abridges  any  right  of  the  people  peace- 
ably to  assemble,  nor  does  it  exclude  them  from  a  hearing.  They  certainly 
do  not  claim  to  be  heard  at  our  bar,  or  to  have  their  petitions  read  and 
printed,  unless  it  be  the  pleasure  of  the  House  to  grant  it,  as  a  matter  of 
respect,  or  with  the  view  to  its  own  information.  This  is  aN  favor  which 
the  House  extends  at  its  own  discretion.  These  abolition  petitioners  are 
heard  as  all  other  petitioners,  and  are  answered  by  the  rule.  The  journals 
of  the  House  show  the  names  of  those  who  vote  for  the  rule,  and  thus 
declare  to  the  petitioners  who  are  in  favor  and  who  are  against  their 
petitions. 

I  repeat,  then,  according  to  our  rules  of  proceeding,  the  petition  is  heard 
and  considered,  and  the  result  is  made  known  by  the  presiding  officer  of  the 
House,  when  he  is  called  on  to  execute  the  rule.  The  answer  is,  then,  as 
distinctly  given  as  if  a  vote  was  had  on  each  and  every  petition.  I  ask, 
then,  why  receive,  debate,  and  consider  each  petition  separately,  when 
the  judgment  of  the  House  has  been  formed  and  taken  against  them  collec- 
tively ?  Such  is  not  the  course  of  proceeding  in  our  courts,  where  the  rights 
of  person  and  of  property  are  involved.  Res  judicata  is  a  rule  of  jurispru- 
dence, not  only  from  its  fitness  and  propriety,  but  because  without  it  an 
end  could  never  be  had  to  litigation.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  the  present  Con- 
gress should  refuse  to  grant  what  has  been  refused  by  its  predecessors  :  but 
I  do  say,  common  respect  for  ourselves  requires  that  we  should  adhere  to 
and  maintain  our  own  judgments. 

But  it  is  demanded  that  we  should  treat  these  abolition  petitions  with  the 
same  respect  we  do  all  others  ;  and  that  we  dare  not  thus  treat  the  petition 
of  the  revolutionary  soldier.  I  will  not  stop  to  inquire  whether  the  aboli- 
tionist be  entiled  to  the  same  respect  as  the  soldier  of  the  Revolution,  whose 
work  he  seeks  to  destroy.  •  But  how  stands  the  case  of  the  soldier  ?  Your 
law  has  declared  your  soldier  shall  only  be  entitled  to  a  pension  on  show- 
ing six  months'  service,  or  more,  and  his  widow,  on  proof  of  marriage  prior 
to  the  year  1794.     Now,  would  you  receive  and  consider  the  petition  of  the 


soldier,  if  he  only  claimed  a  service  of  three  months  ?  or  that  of  his  widow, 
if  married  subsequent  to  the  period  fixed  by  law  ?  If  you  did,  it  would  be 
from  mere  courtesy,  or  with  the  view  of  changing  the  law — considerations 
which  do  not  operate  in  favor  of  abolition  petitions.  In  the  case  of  the 
soldier,  the  law  answers  the  petition  :  in  the  case  of  the  abolitionist,  the 
rule  of  the  House  gives  the  answer.  In  either  case,  the  reception  and  con- 
sideration of  the  petition  would  be  a  useless  consumption  of  time. 

This  brings  me  to  the  question,  whether  the  rule  be  in  itself  right  and  pro- 
per ?  I  understood  the  gentleman  from  New- York  [Mr.  Beardsley]  to  ad- 
mit, if  the  petition  asked  Congress  to  interfere  with  the  institutions  of  slavery 
within  the  States,  it  was  what  we  could  not  constitutionally  do,  and  there- 
fore such  petitions  should  not  be  received  ;  but  if  it  asked  the  abolition  of 
slavery  within  the  District  of  Columbia,  it  then  became  a  question  of  expe- 
diency, and  such  petitions  should  be  received.  Now,  sir,  this  is  the  very 
question  I  desire  to  meet  and  to  answer.  It  is  admitted  it  is  not  constitu- 
tionally competent  for  Congress  to  interfere  with  slavery  as  it  exists  in  the 
States  ;  so  I  deny  that  Congress  possesses  any  rightful  power  to  abolish 
slavery  within  the  District.  The  Constitution  contains  no  grant  or  power 
to  appropriate  the  public  money  to  any  such  purposes.  The  gentleman  from 
New- York  admits  the  master's  right  of  property  in  the  services  of  his  slave. 
It  is  an  admission  any  one  not  a  maniac,  or  infected  with  the  mania  of  abo- 
litionism, is  forced  to  make.  This  right  of  property  existed  both  in  Vir- 
ginia and  Maryland  at  the  time  of  their  deeds  of  cession  to  the  United 
States  of  this  District.  As  early  as  1715,  Maryland,  then  a  colony,  de- 
clared all  persons  of  color  within  its  jurisdiction,  or  who  might  be  brought 
there,  and  their  descendants,  should  be  slaves  for  life.  Such  was  the  statute 
law  in  Maryland  ;  and  the  same  principle  prevailed  in  Virginia.  The  act 
of  cession  by  Virginia  contains  the  following  proviso:  "That  nothing  herein 
contained  shall  be  construed  to  vest  in  the  United  States  any  right  of  pro- 
perty in  the  soil,  or  to  affect  the  rights  of  individuals  therein."  And. 
although  it  has  been  contended  that  this  condition  only  applied  to  the  rights 
of  individuals  in  the  soil,  it  will  be  found  from  the  scope  of  the  whole  act, 
that  this  is  too  narrow  a  construction  ;  and  that  it  is  intended  to  guard  and 
protect  personal  rights  generally.  But  however  that  may  be,  I  do  not  rest 
my  argument  on  that  ground.  I  say  this  protection  of  individuals  in  their 
property  is  secured  by  a  much  higher  power  :  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  Con- 
stitution itself.  The  fifth  article  of  the  Amendments  declares,  "Nor  shall 
private  property  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation.'1'  This 
direct  recognition  of  private  property,  and  that  it  can  only  be  taken  for 
"public  use,"  excludes  the  idea  of  its  being  taken  for  any  other  purpose. 
I  had  supposed  the  gentleman  from  New  York  [Mr.  B]  and  myself  be- 
longed to  the  same  political  school,  so  far  at  least  as  the  constitutional 
powers  of  Congress  were  involved;  that  we  both  drew  our  test  and  rules  of 
construction  from  the  same  high  source  ;  that,  whilst  discarding  the  modern 
doctrine  of  the  general  welfare,  which  substituted  the  will  of  the  majority  for 
the  Constitution,  we  adhered  to  the  good  old  Republican  principles  of  1798, 
as  established  by  Madison  and  Jefferson,  and  as  carried  out  by  honest 
George  Clinton,  when,  as  Vice  President,  he  gave  the  casting  vote  for  the 
rejection  of  a  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the  United  States  Bank.  But  I  fear, 
with  the  gentleman,  as  with  others  who  claim  to  be  within  the  Republican 
fold,  what  was  then  deemed  sound  in  principle  is  now  to  be  taken  as  South- 


era  abstractions.  Will  the  gentleman  turn  to  the  eight  section  of  the  first 
article  of  the  Constitution,  and  tell  me  if  he  finds  there  any  power  to  appro- 
priate the  public  money  to  the  purchase  of  slaves  ?  Yet  in  that  section  is 
to  be  found  an  enumeration  of  your  constitutional  powers.  In  that  section 
I  read  that  Congress  shall  have  power,  inter  alia,  "  to  lay  and  collect  taxes  ; 
to  pay  debts  ;  to  borrow  money  ;  to  regulate  commerce ;  to  establish  post- 
offices  and  post-roads  ;  to  declare  war."  Does  the  gentleman  concur  with 
that  political  class  who  derive  the  power  to  carry  on  a  general  system  of 
internal  improvements  from  the  power  to  regulate  commerce  ?  or  does  he 
derive  it  from  the  power  to  establish  post-offices  and  post-roads  ?  or  will  he 
seek  it  in  the  war  power  ?  No,  says  the  gentleman  ;  he  subscribes  to  no 
such  political  heresies.  But  within  this  District  you  possess  unlimited 
jurisdiction  :  here  your  powers  are  as  omnipotent  as  that  of  Parliament 
itself;  because  here  you  have  the  right fi  to  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases 
whatsoever."  I  shall  not  question  the  right  of  Congress  to  legislation 
within  this  District,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  legislative  bodies  ;  but  still 
it  does  not  follow  that  your  powers  even  here  are  without  limit  or  restric- 
tion. If  so,  what  becomes  of  the  prohibition  against  an  order  of  nobility,  or 
of  an  established  religion,  and  the  free  exercise  thereof?  Can  you  have  an 
order  of  nobility  and  an  established  church  within  the  limits  of  these  ten 
miles  square  ?  And  why  not  ?  Because  of  the  injunctions  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. And  is  not  the  injunction  that  private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
but  for  public  use,  and  that  on  compensation,  just  as  obligatory  in  the  one 
case  as  in  the  other  ?  The  same  article  of  the  Constitution  gives  to  Con- 
gress the  power  to  erect  forts,  magazines,  and  arsenals,  and  grants  it  the 
•'like  authority"  as  within  the  District.  And  am  I  to  be  told  the  land 
ceded  by  North  Carolina  for  an  arsenal  may  be  made  the  receptacle  for 
slaves ;  and  that  Congress  possesses  the  power  of  declaring  that  every 
slave  who  may  enter  its  limits  shall  be  free  ?  If  so,  cannot  you  go  farther, 
and  say  they  shall  be  armed  and  received  into  your  military  ranks ;  and 
thus  give  us  here,  what  are  to  be  found  elsewhere,  regiments  of  blacks  ? 
Can  gentlemen  be  surprised  that  every  Southern  man  should  feel  startled 
at  such  a  claim  of  power  ?  And  to  this  end  must  it  lead,  if  not  met  and 
resisted  at  the  threshold.  I  know  the  gentleman  from  New  York  said, 
whilst  he  claimed  the  right  of  emancipation,  he  waived  the  question  of  com- 
pensation. Now,  with  due  submission,  he  must  allow  me  to  say  this  was 
dodging  the  question.  Your  right  to  emancipate  depends  upon  your  power 
to  compensate.  I  say  you  have  no  constitutional  competency  to  appropriate 
the  public  money  to  any  such  object ;  and,  therefore,  you  cannot  emancipate. 
I  do  not  question  your  right  to  pass  laws  authorizing  their  owners  them- 
selves to  manumit,  either  by  will  or  deed.  What  I  deny  is,  your  power  to 
raise  by  taxes,  levied  on  the  thirteen  slaveholding  States,  the  means  of 
purchasing  from  their  owners,  within  this  District,  their  slaves,  with  or 
without  their  consent.  I  will  not  say,  whenever  you  exercise  this  power  of 
emancipation  within  this  District  the  Union  is  dissolved  ;  I  use  no  such 
threat.  But  this  I  will  say,  when  you  shall  be  so  reckless  of  consequences 
as  to  do  such  an  act,  it  will  be  no  longer  a  debatable  question,  but  that 
every  man  who  is  not  faithless  to  his  own  household  will  stand  to  his 
arms. 

And  now,  Mr.  Speaker,  allow  me  to  notice  the  personal  allusion  of  the 
gentleman  from  Massachusetts,  [Mr.  Hudson.]  That  gentleman  has  thought 


fit  to  ask  me  (for  what  purpose,  I  know  not)  if  I  did  not  myself,  years  ago, 
introduce  an  abolition  petition.  The  same  matter  has  been  repeatedly 
brought  befqre  the  people  of  my  own  State,  where,  I  believe,  it  has  been 
explained  to  the  satisfaction  of  such  as  have  heard  me.  I  was  in  Congress 
for  the  first  time  in  the  years  1821-"22,  when  I  received  a  petition  from  a 
Society  of  Friends,  highly  respectable  persons,  asking  for  the  abolition  of 
slavery  and  for  the  suppression  of  the  African  slave-trade.  The  President 
(Mr.  Monroe)  had  called  the  attention  of  Congress  specially  to  the  latter 
subject;  and  a  Select  Committee  (at  the  head  of  which  was  a  gentleman 
from  South  Carolina)  was  created  on  that  part  of  the  message.  The  peti- 
tion was  presented  by  me,  received,  and  referred  to  that  committee.  Thus 
far  the  subject  was  a  legitimate  one,  and  there  was  nothing  wrong  in  the 
matter.  This  might  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  question.  But  I  desire 
not  to  take  refuge  under  such  a  technical  cover.  At  the  time  I  offered  that 
petition,  all  was  quiet ;  the  fell  spirit  of  abolitionism  had  not  then  sought  to 
disturb  the  harmony  of  our  proceedings  in  this  Hall,  nor  to  poison  the 
public  feeling  in  regard  to  this  distracting  question.  What  was  innocent 
then  would  be  criminal  now.  What  I  then  did,  without  reflection,  I  would 
not  now  do  after  reflection.  The  question  of  jurisdiction  in  regard  to 
slavery  had  not  then  been  made,  at  least  not  to  my  knowledge.  I  trust 
this  answer  will  satisfy  the  gentleman  ;  and  that,  instead  of  seeking  to  find 
a  precedent  to  justify  his  own  conduct,  he  and  his  friends  will  follow  my 
example,  and  promise  in  this  particular  to  sin  no  more. 

I  return  to  the  next  point  in  the  argument,  (the  21st  rule.)  Was  it,  as  has 
been  asserted,  wrong  in  itself,  effecting  mischief,  rather  than  good  ?  By  what 
process  of  reasoning  are  gentlemen  brought  to  this  conclusion  ?  It  is  said 
a  majority  may  grant  leave  to  any  member  to  introduce  a  bill  abolishing 
slavery  within  the  District,  and  pass  it  in  defiance  of  the  rule.  Grant  it ;  and 
what  does  that  prove  ?  That  the  rule  is  either  useless  or  mischievous  ? 
Most  certainly  not.  On  the  contrary,  it  establishes  that  the  right,  which  is 
so  zealously  insisted  on,  is  in  itself  useless.  If  the  majority  have  the  right 
of  action,  as  I  admit  they  have,  then  why  trouble  ourselves  with  receiving, 
hearing,  and  referring  these  petitions  ?  It  is  because  the  majority  say  they 
are  not  disposed  to  act,  that  I  insist  on  the  utility  of  the  rule.  My  colleague 
says  he  is  opposed  to  abolishing  slavery,  and  a  majority  concur  in  that  opi- 
nion. Then,  I  ask,  for  what  end  receive  and  consider  these  petitions  ?  Does 
he  desire  to  bring  this  out-door  sentiment  to  operate  in  the  House,  so  as  to 
change  our  present  majority  into  a  minority  ?  I  hope  not.  I  have  no  dis- 
position to  disturb  the  relation  between  the  constituent  and  his  representa- 
tive. I  admit  confidence,  mutual  and  endearing,  which  should  subsist  be- 
tween the  representative  and  constituent,  to  constitute  the  brightest  gem  in 
the  diadem  of  a  representative  Government.  I  desire  not  to  tarnish  its  lustre ; 
but  still  I  cannot  consent  to  see  the  bad  feeling  out  of  the  House  brought  to 
operate  here,  in  order  to  change  what  all  should  admit  to  be  right.  Gentle- 
men deceive  themselves  when  they  say  discussion  on  this  subject  can  do  no 
mischief.  It  is  one  of  the  very  ends  resorted  to,  in  order  to  render  the  slave 
discontented  with  his  condition.  And  I  doubt  not  the  triumph  which  the 
gentleman  from  Massachusetts  [Mr.  Adams,]  says  he  has  gained  within 
these  walls,  has  already  been  sounded  elsewhere.  I  beg  not  to  be  misunder- 
stood. Whilst  the  South  does  not  fear  the  slave,  and  believes  them  contented 
if  not  excited  into  mischief,  none  are  so  hardy  as  not  to  dread  the  awful  con- 


10 

sequences  of  insurrection.  It  has  not  been  the  fortune  of  my  colleague,  nor 
of  other  members  on  this  floor,  as  it  has  been  mine,  after  these  threatened 
insurrections,  to  stand  by  the  anxious  mother  as  she  watched*over  the  sweet 
slumbers  of  her  innocent  babe,  when  the  smallest  whisper,  like  the  fire-bell 
at  midnight,  beats  alarm  to  a  thousand  fears.  I  say,  then,  to  gentlemen* 
unless  they  are  prepared  to  act,  to  pause — and  to  silence  forever  these  mad 
disturbers  of  our  peace  and  repose. 

I  come  now,  Mr.  Speaker,  to  the  last  point  which  has  been  made  in  this 
discussion,  and  that  is,  the  call  upon  the  South  to  surrender  this  rule,  in  order 
to  propitiate  the  public  sentiment  of  the  North,  and  to  save  those  friends 
who  have  stood  so  manfully  by  us  on  this  question.  So  far  as  my  colleague 
is  concerned,  his  appeal  has  but  little  effect.  He  has  acknowledged  his  oppo- 
sition to  the  rule — that  he  thinks  it  wrong,  and  ought  to  be  given  up  ;  and 
his  political  friends  at  the  North  have  voted  against  it.  Yes,  sir:  if  the  gen- 
tleman will  take  the  trouble  to  examine,  he  will  find  hut  a  single  Whig  vote 
in  favor  of  the  rule  north  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line,  and  the  head  of  that 
individual  has,  within  a  few  days,  fallen  a  victim  to  the  guillotine  in  the 
other  end  of  the  Capitol.  So  to  the  gentleman  from  Massachusetts,  [Mr.. 
Adams,]  who  seeks  to  propitiate  high  Heaven  as  a  reward  for  his  exertions, 
and  claims  the  applauding  vox  Dei,  to  cheer  him  on  in  his  heedless  course, 
I  turn  with  a  deaf  ear.  The  gentleman  from  New  York,  [Mr.  Beardsley,] 
comes  in  a  still  more  questionable  shape.  He  claims  not  the  approbation 
of  Heaven,  but  the  plaudits  of  vox  populi ;  and  from  the  signs  of  the  limes, 
and  the  billing  and  cooing  in  certain  quarters,  it  is  not  difficult  to  divine 
whose  favour  he  seeks  to  gain.  Let  me,  then,  say  to  gentlemen,  in  all  candor, 
if  the  Democracy  of  the  South  are  to  be  thrown  off  for  these  abolition 
allies,  all  we  desire  is,  to  know  it,  that  we  may  take  our  discharge  without 
asking.  The  call  coming  from  such  quarters  as  these,  I  regard  not.  But 
those  who  have  hitherto  acted  with  us  in  good  faith,  and  whose  sincerity 
we  cannot  now  question,  for  one,  I  am  prepared  to  treat  with  the  utmost 
kindness  and  respect.  To  such  I  beg  to  say,  they  greatly  deceive  them- 
selves if  they  can  possibly  suppose  any  modification,  or  even  the  repeal  of 
this  rule,  will  silence  this  out-door  clamor  about  the  right  of  petition.  No, 
sir.  And  I  beg  to  invite  for  a  moment  the  attention  of  my  Northern  friends 
to  the  legislative  history  in  regard  to  this  matter.  These  abolition  petitions 
had  been  received,  and  referred  generally  to  the  Committee  on  the  District  of 
Columbia,  where  they  remained  without  action.  This  course  was  not  satis- 
factory to  the  petitioners,  and  they  became  so  clamorous,  that,  in  1 836,  they 
were  referred  to  a  Select  Committee,  of  which  Mr.  Pinckney,  of  South  Caro- 
lina, was  chairman.  That  Committee  reported  three  resolutions  :  1st,  That 
Congress  possessed  no  constitutional  power  to  interfere  with  the  institution 
of  slavery  in  the  States  ;  2d,  That  they  ought  not  to  abolish  slavery  within  the 
District ;  and,  3d,  That  all  abolition  petitions  should  be  laid  upon  the  table 
without  debate.  These  resolutions  were  adopted  by  large  majorities.  Still  the 
abolitionists  were  not  satisfied,  and  these  petitions  continued  to  multiply  and 
disturb  the  proceedings  of  this  House.  Next  came  the  Atherton  resolutions, 
in  the  year  1838,  which  declared,  in  substance,  that  it  was  not  competent  for 
Congress  to  interfere  with  the  question  of  slavery  in  the  States ;  that  any 
interference  with  the  matter  within  the  District  of  Columbia,  with  intent  to 
abolish  slavery  within  the  States,  was  against  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution, 
and  in  violation  of  the  public  faith ;  and  that  all  petitions  touching  the  ques- 


11 

tion  of  slavery  should  be  laid  upon  the  table  without  debate.  These  resolu- 
tions were  adopted  at  a  period  of  great  excitement ;  and  as  they  admitted 
the  reception  of  the  petitions,  it  was  hoped  the  matter  might  end.  Not  so  ; 
when  the  House  was  driven  into  the  adoption  of  the  21st  rule,  which  forbids 
their  reception.  "With  these  recorded  facts  before  their  eyes,  I  ask  gentle- 
men, in  all  candor,  how  it  is  possible  for  them  to  suppose  the  mere  recep- 
tion of  these  petitions  will  silence  their  clamors  about  the  right  of  pe- 
tition ?  They  might  as  soon  expect  to  extinguish  the  conflagration,  by 
adding  fuel  to  the  flames.  I  repeat,  then,  there  is  but  one  alternative — rejec- 
tion without  action,  or  reception  and  action.  There  is  no  middle  ground 
that  can  satisfy  those  who  are  resolved  to  press  this  matter,  whatever  its 
consequences.  You  would  not  listen  to  the  petition  of  him  who  calls  upon 
you  to  fire  the  splendid  edifice  in  which  we  now  sit.  Why,  then,  encourage 
these  new  incendiaries,  who  seek  to  destroy  the  very  temple  of  liberty,  and 
involve  in  its  ruins  all  that  we  hold  dear  on  earth.  [Here  the  morning  hour 
expired,  and  Mr.  S.  was  forced  to  take  his  seat.] 

Mr.  Speaker,  allow  me  to  devote  the  short  time  I  have  left  of  my  hour, 
in  a  reference  to  some  other  matters  in  support  of  what  I  said  on  a  former 
day,  that  nothing  short  of  action  will  satisfy  these  abolition  petitioners.  I 
beg,  in  the  first  place,  to  refer  the  gentleman  from  Massachusetts,  [Mr. 
Adams,]  and  those  who  think  with  him  that  Congress  is  bound  to  receive 
these  petitions,  to  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Rules,  consisting  of  a 
majority  of  his  political  friends,  and  the  chairman  his  own  colleague,  made 
at  the  first  session  of  the  last  Congress.  He  will  there  find  that  the  com- 
mittee recommend  a  modification  of  the  rule,  so  far  as  to  provide,  that  the 
question  of  reception  shall  be  considered  as  made  on  the  presentation  of  any 
abolition  petition,  and  that  question  shall  be  laid  on  the  table  without  debate ; 
thus  yielding  the  question  of  reception,  and  avoiding  that  of  jurisdiction, 
against  which  the  South  contends.  I  again  call  the  attention  of  my  Northern 
friends  to  what  is  transpiring  on  this  floor,  to  satisfy  them  that  nothing  but 
mischief  can  follow  the  repeal  of  this  rule.  You  will  have  a  discussion 
of  the  whole  matter  on  the  question  of  reception  of  each  petition.  How 
much  better,  then,  even  so  far  as  time  is  concerned,  that  the  question  should 
be  met  at  once,  by  excluding  such  petitions  altogether.  You  have  seen 
the  character  of  the  petitions  introduced  on  yesterday  by  the  gentlemen  from 
Ohio  [Mr.  Gjddings]  and  New  York  [Mr.  Beardsley.]  The  Constitu- 
tion directs  that  all  fugitive  slaves  *'  shall  be  delivered  up,"  whenever  they 
may  escape  from  one  State  into  another,  on  the  claim  of  their  master.  And 
Congress,  by  the  act  passed  as  early  as  1793,  has  provided  the  legal  mode  of 
asserting  this  claim,  and  of  recovering  the  fugitive.  The  Supreme  Court, 
by  a  recent  decision,  has  said  this  power  of  legislation  belongs  to  Congress, 
independent  of  the  States;  and  yet  these  petitioners  call  on  Congress  to 
revoke  this  injunction  of  the  Constitution,  and  to  protect  the  runaway  slaves 
from  their  masters.  Such  an  application,  one  would  have  supposed,  could 
have  found  no  countenance  here,  I  desire  further  to  call  the  attention  of 
gentlemen  to  another  proceeding  in  this  House — to  the  resolution  coming 
from  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  which  has  been  received  and  refer- 
red to  a  select  committee  ;  which  resolution,  the  gentleman  [Mr.  Adams]  in- 
formed us,  came  from  a  Democratic  majority  of  that  Legislature.  I  beg  to 
refer  the  gentleman  to  a  different  paternity  for  the  origin  of  his  resolution, 
as  well  as  to  a  different  source  for  its  revival.     The  House  had  not  forgot- 


12 

ten  the  petition  of  George  Latimer,  backed  by  fifty-odd  thousand  persons 
from  the  gentleman's  own  State.  Let  me  tell  gentlemen,  and  my  own  col- 
league, who  this  George  Latimer  was  :  a  runaway  slave  from  the  State  of 
Virginia — a  slave  who  had  been  pronounced  as  the  property  of  his  owner 
by  one  of  the  Judges  of  your  own  Supreme  Court ;  and  still  that  law-abiding 
people  was  unwilling  that  this  man  should  recover  his  property,  and  had 
forced  him  to  dispose  of  it  at  a  mere  nominal  price.  And  yet  my  colleague 
is  willing  to  throw  open  the  door  of  this  House  to  receive  the  petition  of 
runaway  negroes.  And  are  we  to  sit  here,  receive,  hear,  and  consider  peti- 
tions coming  from  slaves,  painting  in  all  the  horrors  of  their  imagina- 
tion their  former  condition,  and  slandering  and  abusing  the  people  of  the 
Soutli  ?  This  may  accord  with  what  the  gentleman  may  consider  as  due  to 
the  South ;  but  it  does  not  accord  with  my  notions,  or  that  of  the  people  I 
represent.  Let  me,  Mr.  Speaker,  trace  this  petition  a  little  farther.  Not 
having  received  a  favorable  hearing  here,  we  next  hear  of  it  in  the  Legisla- 
ture of  Massachusetts.  It  there  met  a  more  favorable  reception,  being 
referred  to  a  select  committee,  the  chairman  of  which  was  the  son  of  the 
gentleman,  [Mr.  Adams  ;]  and  in  his  report  we  find  the  same  arguments  we 
have  often  heard  from  the  lips  of  his  father.  Such  had  been  the  revival. 
Now,  sir,  for  the  origin  of  this  proposition.  The  House  had  not  forgotten 
some  of  the  memorable  occurrences  of  the  late  war — that  this  same  State  of 
Massachusetts  had  then  called  a  Convention,  which  afterwards  sat  at  Hart- 
ford, in  Connecticut.  Yes,  sir;  during  the  darkest  period  of  that  war,  the 
persons  there  assembled,  (as  appears  from  Niles's  Register,  which  I  hold  in 
my  hand,)  had  agreed  on  this  very  proposition  to  amend  the  Constitution,  by 
uprooting  and  destroying  the  very  basis  upon  which  the  Constitution  rests, 
by  depriving  the  Southern  portion  of  the  Union  of  that  representation  on 
which  is  founded  the  only  surety  for  their  slave  property.  Yes ;  our  labor  is 
to  be  taxed,  in  order  that  its  proceeds  may  be  appropriated  to  our  own  de- 
struction. Gentlemen  deceive  themselves  if  they  suppose  a  free  people  can 
or  will  submit  to  such  an  act  of  self-destruction.  But,  Mr.  Speaker,  you 
have  not  forgotten  the  reception  of  those  who  came  here  to  submit  such  a 
proposition  as  this  to  a  Republican  Congress.  The  country  had  then  been 
delivered  from  war;  the  bosom  of  every  lover  of  his  country  beat  with  gra- 
titude for  this  deliverence ;  the  war  had  just  closed  in  a  blaze  of  glory ; 
the  star-spangled  banner  floated  on  the  mountain  wave ;  and  the  American 
eagle  flapped  his  wings  in  triumph  on  the  plains  of  New  Orleans.  It  was  at 
a  period  like  this  that  the  emissaries  arrived.  Did  they  come  within  these 
walls  and  ask  this  House  to  receive  their  message  ?  No,  sir.  They  skulked 
away  in  darkness,  fit  objects  for  the  slow  unmoving  finger  of  scorn  to  be 
pointed  at.  And  this  was  the  proposition,  conceived  in  disaffection  and 
brought  forth  in  treason,  which  had,  at  this  day,  been  received  and  honored 
with  a  select  committee. 

In  conclusion,  as  I  have  but  a  minute  or  two  remaining,  let  me  once  more 
appeal  to  my  Northern  friends.  I  ask  the  gentleman  from  Maine,  if  there 
be  any  here  who  have  hitherto  stood  by  us,  why  should  they  now  give  way  ? 
I  turn  to  our  friends  from  Connecticut,  and  ask  them,  why  should  they  yield  ? 
If  I  appeal  in  vain,  I  turn  to  those  by  whom  I  know  the  appeal  will  be  an- 
swered— to  patriotic  New  Hampshire ;  whose  sons,  like  her  granite  basis,  had 
hitherto  breasted  the  storm — they,  I  know,  will  not  give  way.  So  I  call  upon 
our  friends  from  the  Keystone  State,  not  to  surrender  because  a  single  soldier 


13 

in  the  South  has  deserted  us  on  this  trying  occasion.  To  the  few,  but 
Spartan  hand  from  the  great  State  of  New  York,  though  threatened  with  the 
public  sentiment  of  this  new-born  Democracy,  I  would  say,  be  firm,  and 
the  day  was  not  distant  when  they,  too,  would  be  honored,  like  those  who 
had  stood  by  the  Constitution  and  the  country  in  the  dark  days  of  the 
Missouri  question.  But  if  these  invocations  were  all  in  vain,  then  would  I 
turn  with  pleasure  and  delight  to  the  gallant  and  patriotic  West.  Here 
Mr.  S.  was  forced  to  conclude  from  the  expiration  of  his  hour. 


